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Abstract. Opposition theory suggests that binary oppositions (e.g., high vs. low) underlie 
basic cognitive and linguistic processes. However, opposition theory has never been 
implemented in a computational cognitive-semiotics model. In this paper, we present a 
simple model of metaphor identifi cation that relies on opposition theory. An algorithm 
instantiating the model has been tested on a data set of 100 phrases comprising adjective-
noun pairs in which approximately a half represent metaphorical language-use (e.g., dark 
thoughts) and the rest literal language-use (e.g., dark hair). Th e algorithm achieved 89% 
accuracy in metaphor identifi cation and illustrates the relevance of opposition theory 
for modelling metaphor processing.
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Introduction
Th e idea that binary oppositions (i.e., contraries) stand at the heart of cognitive and 
linguistic processes is one of structuralism’s basic tenets, which starts with the ideas of 
Ferdinand de Saussure (1916) (Danesi 2007). Th e criticism launched against this theory 
(Derrida 1967) mainly points at its shortcomings in explaining the complexity of human 
behaviour. Regardless of acknowledging the minimal explanatory power of opposition 
theory, one has to admit that there has not been a successful translation of this theory 
into a computational cognitive-semiotics model. We use the term ‘computational’ in 
the very limited sense of testing a model through computational tools and resources 
without obliging ourselves to a specifi c theory of mind. Th e importance of producing 
such a model is both in using the theory for addressing current scientifi c challenges 
and for providing some empirical support for the theory.
In this paper, we aim to address the above challenge by using opposition theory to 
design an algorithm for automatic metaphor identifi cation, and to provide through the 
success of this algorithm some empirical support for the relevance of this theory that might 
be considered anachronistic in the contemporary era of “post-structuralist” ideologies.
Th e paper is organized as follows. We fi rst provide a short introduction of opposition 
theory in its historical context. Next, we present the idea of metaphor and the challenge 
of automatic metaphor identifi cation. Th is theoretical background is followed by a 
simple and novel model of metaphor identifi cation and an algorithm that instantiates 
the model. Finally we provide an empirical test of the algorithm against a human-
annotated dataset. We conclude by discussing an antiquarian approach seeking to 
revive old semiotic ideas through the use of modern tools of computational semantics.
Opposition theory
It was Saussure (1916) who fi rst made opposition an inherent principle of linguistic 
structure, which he labeled diff érence. In the 1920s, the Prague School linguists (e.g., 
Jakobson et al. 1928; Trubetzkoy 1939) devised the fi rst fully developed theory of 
opposition, which they used to carry out extensive analyses of specifi c natural languages. 
Opposition theory thus became synonymous with structuralism (Wallon 1945; Parsons, 
Bales 1955; Godel 1957; Lévi-Strauss 1958, 1971; Blanché 1966; Belardi 1970; Needham 
1973; Ivanov 1974; Fox 1974, 1975; Lorrain 1975).
It must be noted that from a modern psychological perspective oppositions may be 
related to the fact that all well-defi ned categories must have a complement. Th at is, in 
order to identify a category the mind must distinguish members from non-members. 
Th is basic tenet of the mind may be the source of oppositions and will be further 
discussed in our model.
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Th e fi rst in-depth psychological study of the validity of opposition was Ogden’s classic 
treatise, Opposition: A Linguistic and Psychological Analysis (1932). Ogden expanded 
several key ideas he had discussed previously with I. A. Richards in Th e Meaning of 
Meaning (1923). For Ogden, a small set of conceptual oppositions, such as right/left  
and yes/no, were universal and intrinsically binary. Other (non-oppositional) concepts 
showed gradients as Bolinger (1968) later called them.
Th e technical framework for using opposition theory was developed by the Prague 
School and the Copenhagen School linguists (Hjelmslev 1939, 1959). Even within the 
generative framework of linguistic analyses, which pits itself against structuralism, this 
theory has been incorporated to carry out phonological analyses (Chomsky, Halle 1968; 
McCarthy 2001; Haspelmath 2006).
Starting in the 1980s, opposition theory was extended to encompass the study of all 
kinds of expressive phenomena, from discourse and narrative structure, to textuality 
and visual art (Barbaresi 1988; Mettinger 1994; Mel’čuk 2001; Elšík, Matras 2006). 
Th e spread of Peircean (1931–1958) theory in the late 1960s into the mainstream 
of semiotic method, led initially to a de-emphasis of structuralist theory. However, 
Peircean theory was never antithetical to Prague School structuralism. On the contrary, 
as research has shown, Peircean semiotics and structuralism are highly compatible, or 
more precisely, complementary, models of semiosis (Andersen 1989, 2001, 2008; Tomic 
1989). Completing the overall historical picture are the insights of the Tartu School 
semioticians under the leadership of Juri Lotman (cf. Lotman 1991), who utilized 
opposition theory to show how diff erent cultural codes are interconnected to each 
other in oppositional ways (Andrews 2003; Lepik, 2008).
Th e Prague School linguists formalized the opposition in terms of the theory of 
distinctive features. For example, in the phonemic opposition /p/-vs.-/b/ (pin/bin) the 
relevant diff erential feature is (±voice), whereas in /b/-vs.-/m/ (beat/meat) it is (±nasal). 
Work on distinctive feature theory led, in turn, to a more comprehensive typology of 
oppositions (Trubetzkoy 1939), including: multidimensional, in which the distinctive 
features in one opposition occur in others; one-dimensional, in which the features in 
a specifi c opposition do not occur in others; isolated, in which the features that occur 
in specifi c oppositions, occur nowhere else in the system; proportional, in which the 
features constituting certain oppositions are repeated in others; privative, in which 
signs are distinguished by only one feature; gradual, which involves varying degrees of 
a feature; and equipollent, in which oppositions are distinguished by several features.
Applying distinctive-feature analysis to phonemic oppositions was a straightforward 
and largely unproblematic procedure. However, problems emerged when the same 
type of analysis was applied to conceptual oppositions. Pairs such as man-vs.-woman, 
boy-vs.-girl, for instance, could be easily distinguished in terms of features such as 
(±human), (±gender), (±adulthood), called semes or classemes by some structuralists 
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(Hjelmslev 1959; Coseriu 1973; Pottier 1974). However, how would one distinguish 
between, say, heifer-vs.-mare? Which distinctive feature triggers the opposition, (±bovine) 
or (±equine)? Th ere is really no way to establish which one is conceptually the trigger. 
To put it in more technical structuralist terms, it is diffi  cult to determine which one is 
marked and which one is unmarked – a problem that will be taken up below.
Moreover, a vast array of distinctive features would be needed to make distinctions of 
this kind in the fi rst place (Schooneveld 1978), rendering the whole analytical exercise 
logically impracticable. Th e alternative may be to decide on a small axiomatic set of 
semes that cut across languages and are thus considered to be universal. Research 
on identifying such a set is ongoing, but it has yet to yield a set of features that may 
explain all kinds of conceptual oppositions (see, for example, the perceptive work of 
Wierzbicka 1996, 1997, 1999, 2003).
However, one should realize that unlike phonological and grammatical systems, 
which are closed form-based systems, conceptual systems are open-ended and, thus, 
diffi  cult to pin down to a fi nite set of distinctive values. Th is conclusion has been reached 
in a study of antonyms where Paradis, Willners and Jones suggest that “antonymy has 
conceptual basis and meanings are negotiated in the context where they occur” (Paradis 
et al. 2009: 381).
Th e Prague School linguists soon came to realize that binary oppositions were not 
the only ones to characterize codes. Th ey found various degrees of oppositional structure 
in various codes (Pos 1938; Jakobson 1939; Trubetzkoy 1939; Martinet 1960). Th us, 
oppositions can be strictly binary (right-vs.-left ), ternary (past-present-future), four-part 
(addition-subtraction-multiplication-division), and so on. Th e type of opposition that 
emerges in a system depends on the system itself.
Th e anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss (1958), for example, showed that pairs of 
oppositions oft en cohered into sets forming recognizable units within specifi c cultural 
codes or systems. In a similar train of thought, Greimas (1966, 1970, 1987) introduced 
the notion of the semiotic square – a model of opposition involving two sets of concepts 
forming a square arrangement. In eff ect, by extending opposition theory, it has become 
obvious that its relevance to the study of semiosis and representation is as pivotal today 
as it was when Saussure and the early structuralists put it forward.
Metaphors and metaphor identifi cation
Denotation is the literal sense of a word, and connotation, its extended meaning. 
For instance, in the word pair ‘sweet bananas’, the word ‘sweet’ is used in the literal 
sense while in the word pair ‘sweet babies’ it is used in its extended meaning. In fact, 
adjective-noun connotations such as those instantiated by ‘sweet babies’ are considered as 
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metaphors and as a specifi c type of noun-based metaphors known as Type III metaphors 
(Krishnakumaran, Zhu 2007).
From a wider theoretical perspective, the prevalence of metaphors in human thinking 
and language (Lakoff , Johnson 1980, 1999) and the way they provide a context for 
human reasoning have turned them into a major object of research not only in cognitive 
linguistics and psychology (Gibbs et al. 2004; Kintsch 2000; Th ibodeau, Boroditsky 
2011) but in natural language processing too (Assaf et al. 2013; Birke, Sarkar 2007; 
Krishnakumaran, Zhu 2007; Neuman et al. 2013; Neuman et al. In press; Turney et 
al. 2011).
While human beings naturally process metaphors, replicating this human ability 
to detect and perceive metaphors in silico is far from trivial. Th e fi rst task facing an 
intelligent system in comprehending a metaphorical expression, or more accurately 
an utterance suspected to be metaphorical, is to identify it as such. In other words, 
metaphor identifi cation is the fi rst phase in processing a metaphor. Indeed, one of the 
main challenges in Natural Language Processing (NLP) is metaphor identifi cation.
Despite the alleged simplicity of this task, years of intensive research have shown 
limited results and the models designed for metaphor comprehension were not able 
to successfully simulate human intelligence. As argued quite recently by Veale (2011: 
278; our emphasis) “… while computationally interesting, none (of these models) has 
yet achieved the scalability or robustness needed to make a signifi cant practical impact 
outside the laboratory.” However, recent cognitively motivated algorithms (Turney et al. 
2011; Assaf et al. 2013; Neuman et al. 2013) have shown that metaphor identifi cation 
is feasible and may have important consequences for natural language understanding.
For addressing the challenge of metaphor identifi cation through opposition theory, 
we focus on one type of metaphor. Following Krishnakumaran and Zhu’s approach 
(cf. Krishnakumaran, Zhu 2007), we restrict the scope of this paper to metaphoric 
usages involving nouns and to adjective-noun metaphors only. We focus on this type of 
metaphor as recent advances in natural language processing (Turney et al. 2011; Assaf 
et al. 2013) have led to signifi cant advancements in identifying this type of metaphor 
and to high correlation with human performance.
Th e decision to focus our eff orts on the identifi cation of adjective-noun metaphors 
clearly limits the scope of the current study. Th erefore, the current study does not 
pretend to cover the whole spectrum of metaphorical language-use or even the whole 
spectrum of adjective-noun metaphors.
Th ere have been several strategies for metaphor identifi cation (Birke, Sarkar 2007; 
Krishnakumaran, Zhu 2007; Turney et al. 2011). Most of these methods demand heavy 
computational resources as they rely on computationally demanding processes such 
as Word Sense Disambiguation (Navigeli 2009). In addition, none of these models/
algorithms involved opposition theory as a guiding theory. In the next section we 
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introduce a simple and computationally economic model of Type III metaphor 
identifi cation and present an algorithm that instantiates this model.
The model and the algorithm
Our model is simple; in addition to opposition theory it draws on several converging 
ideas from cognitive sciences and linguistics. First, we use the notion of markedness 
pointing to the asymmetry between elements of linguistic and conceptual structures. 
As argued by Haspelmath (2006), “Th e term ‘markedness’ is superfl uous, because some 
of the concepts that it denotes are not helpful, and others are better expressed by more 
straightforward, less ambiguous terms.” Here we adhere to a very general sense of 
markedness as asymmetry between the adjective modifying the noun in a target word 
pair (e.g., ‘high standards’) and its antonym.
It is important to realize that the adjective modifying the noun in an adjective-
noun pair is a conceptual category: ‘sweet’ is a category; ‘hard’ is a category; ‘dark’ is 
a category, and so on.
As argued by Harnad (2005), most cognition is the acquisition of categories and at 
the heart of adaptive cognition and behaviour is doing the right things with categories. 
In this context, Harnad (1982) suggests that a metaphor constitutes an apposition, the 
collation of two embodied traces of experience analogues of the experience.
Th is suggestion is in line with the selectional preference approach (Light, Greiff  2002) 
to metaphor identifi cation (Wilks 1975), suggesting that metaphorical language-use 
involves some kind of violation of literal use. For instance, the phrase ‘sweet baby’ is 
metaphorical as ‘sweet’ is an embodied category basically applicable to objects we can 
taste. Th at is, objects belonging to the FOOD category. A ‘sweet baby’ is therefore a 
violation of ‘sweet’ selectional preference as ‘baby’ does not belong to the preferred FOOD 
category. In this context, judging whether an adjective-noun phrase is metaphorical may 
use the conceptual opposition of the adjective linguistically expressed as its antonym. Th e 
fact that ‘sweet baby’ may be considered as a “dead metaphor” is of no relevance to our 
case. While teaching computers to identify metaphors we may insert a whole dictionary 
to the machine, a dictionary stating explicitly that a certain phrase is metaphorical, or 
may provide it with a general algorithm to do it by itself. Here we follow a more general 
and fl exible approach of introducing a metaphor identifi cation model that identifi es 
metaphors regardless of them being “dead” or “alive”.
In the context of adjective-noun metaphors, we must emphasize as Harnad (personal 
correspondence Feb. 2013) suggests that there is a crucial diff erence between the digital 
binary nature of object categories and the analogue continuous nature of property 
categories. For instance, ‘living’ versus ‘non-living’ is categorical while ‘sweet’ is relative 
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and context dependent. Harnad (2013) also suggests that metaphor is evident when 
a similarity judgment (i.e., this resembles that) is somehow treated as or becomes a 
categorization.
It was shown that antonymy, which is the expression of opposition in the lexicon, 
has a conceptual basis and that antonyms may be conceptually distinguished in terms 
of binary oppositions (Paradis et al. 2009). If there is an asymmetry between the 
adjective modifying a given noun and its antonym representing its conceptual binary 
opposition, then in cases of metaphorical language-use the antonym of the adjective 
should be semantically related to a lesser extent with the noun its opposing adjective 
modifi es. In other words, the markedness of the adjective, the conceptual asymmetry 
it has with its opposing conceptual category, may be used for metaphor identifi cation! 
Here we present our research hypothesis. In a case of literal language-use, we should 
expect that the adjective and its major antonym are both conceptual categories that 
modify the noun’s category to a similar extent. By ‘modify’ we mean that they have 
informational value. For instance, some things in the world are sweet. Some sweet 
objects belong to the FOOD category in which CAKE is a subcategory/member, and 
their intersection is ‘sweet cake’.
Th e antonym of ‘sweet’ can be ‘bitter’. In this case, ‘bitter’ is associated with CAKE 
too because FOOD, which is the super-ordinate category of CAKE, can be bitter. Th is 
is not the case with metaphorical language-use. For instance, let us compare the word 
pair ‘bitter relations’ to the word pair ‘bitter chocolate’. In the case of the literal pair 
(i.e., bitter chocolate) it is highly reasonable that the antonym of ‘bitter’ – ‘sweet’ – will 
be associated with ‘chocolate’ to a larger extent than it is associated with ‘relations’.
In sum, our model hypothesizes that in cases of literal use, we should expect a higher 
level of symmetry between the adjective and its antonym in the sense that both of them 
are semantically related modifi ers of the noun. In contrast, in a case of metaphorical 
language-use we should expect asymmetry because the metaphorical use violates the 
‘selectional preference’ of the adjective, which means that certain embodied categories 
of experience are less likely to modify other categories.
Based on this simple theorization, we empirically measured the semantic similarity 
between the antonym of a given adjective and the noun modifi ed by the adjective in 
the word pair, and used the outcome of this measurement process in order to predict 
whether the word pair is metaphorical or literal.
In this context, it must be emphasized that our model is applicable only to cases 
where the adjective has a clear antonym. Th erefore, we have no pretensions to cover 
the whole spectrum of metaphor identifi cation and not even the whole spectrum of 
adjective-noun metaphors. 
Our model/algorithm is straightforward. Given a word pair we fi rst identify the 
antonym of the adjective and second we measure the semantic similarity between the 
166 Dan Assaf, Yochai Cohen, Marcel Danesi, Yair Neuman
antonym and the noun modifi ed by the original adjective. To measure the similarity 
between the antonym and the target noun we used the state-of-the-art knowledge in 
computational semantics and measured the similarity through a vector space model 
of semantics (Turney, Pantel 2010). More specifi cally we draw on a term-to-context 
similarity matrix developed by Turney et al. 2011. Th is matrix allows us to measure 
the semantic similarity between two terms (e.g., ‘bitter’ and ‘baby’) by calculating the 
cosine between the rows of the matrix. Th e only relevant variable for predicting whether 
the phrase is metaphorical is the similarity between the antonym and the noun. To test 
this algorithm we used the dataset described in the next section.
The dataset
Our model/hypothesis has been tested on a dataset developed by Turney et al. 2011. For 
their experiment, Turney et al. 2011 used ﬁve adjectives: ‘dark’, ‘deep’, ‘hard’, ‘sweet’, and 
‘warm’. Th is dataset is limited to fi ve adjectives only and therefore we are very cautious 
in generalizing our results. However, Turney et al.’s 2011 paper was presented at one 
of the most competitive conferences in the fi eld of NLP (EMNLP), and as such the 
dataset is qualifi ed as a satisfactory benchmark for comparison. In addition, since the 
resources allocated to the current study were limited, we settled for a limited dataset as a 
“proof-of-concept” only. In a future study, we plan to test our model on a larger dataset.
     For each of the adjectives, Turney et al. 2011 composed twenty word pairs in which 
the ﬁrst word is the adjective and the second word is a noun. Th ese pairs were identiﬁed 
through the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA) (Davies 2009), which 
is the most representative corpus of American English, and by seeking the nouns that 
follow each adjective in the corpus and sorting the candidate adjective-noun pairs by 
frequency. Turney et al. 2011 required minimum mutual information (MI) of 3 between 
the adjective and the noun in order to assure that the noun is statistically signifi cantly 
collocated with the adjective. Th e decision to use a minimal MI of 3 is based on the 
corpus norms. In some of the test pairs, the adjective was used in a metaphorical sense 
(e.g., ‘dark thoughts’) and in the rest in a literal sense (e.g., ‘dark skin’). Five judges, 
undergraduate students in psychology, were asked to judge whether the use of the 
adjective is literal or metaphorical and reached a high level of interjudge reliability 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .95). Concrete-Abstract, which is the algorithm developed by 
Turney et al. 2011, was able to predict the judges’ average rating with 79% accuracy.
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Analysis and results
Our algorithm uses only one variable in order to predict whether the pair is metaphorical 
or not – the similarity of the adjective’s antonym with the target noun. For identifying 
the antonyms, we used the Oxford English Dictionary to identify the fi rst antonym of 
each of our fi ve adjectives.
In Turney et al.’s 2011 dataset, 44 of the pairs are metaphorical and the other 56 
literal. Th erefore, the baseline for prediction is 56%. We used Binary Logistic Regression 
Analysis as our statistical model. Binary Logistic Regression is a type of probabilistic 
classifi cation model where the dependent variable is a binary dichotomous variable 
with two values only. We used this model in order to measure our ability to classify 
the adjective-noun phrases into two categories: metaphorical and literal, based on the 
independent continuous variable that is the similarity of the adjective’s antonym with 
the target noun.
Using a Binary Logistic Regression with the antonym’s similarity as the independent 
variable and the word pair type as a criterion (0 = literal pair, 1 = metaphorical pair), 
produced statistically signifi cant results (χ2 = 77.36, p < .001) with 89% accuracy. Th is 
means that in 89% of the cases in our dataset our algorithm was able to classify a word 
pair correctly as metaphorical or literal. In other words, in 89% of the word pairs our 
algorithm has automatically reached a decision that is in agreement with the decision 
reached by the human judges in Turney et al.’s 2011 study.  Th e precision was 88%, 
which means that when predicting that a phrase (e.g., ‘dark hair’) is metaphorical our 
algorithm was correct in 88% of the cases. Th e recall was 86%, which means that our 
algorithm correctly identifi ed 86% of the metaphorical pairs in the dataset.
Discussion
Under the infl uence of Chomsky, modern linguistics, specifi cally in the United States, 
has been demarcating a sharp line between language as an abstract mathematical 
structure, and human cognitive processes rich in semantics. Along a similar line, modern 
cognition inspired by early computational models considered language to be a realm 
categorically diff erentiated from linguistic semantic processes. Th is sharp divide is evident 
in discussions of the so-called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. However, recently there has been 
accumulating evidence that the sharp line portrayed between ‘language’ and ‘thought’, to 
use Vygotsky’s original terminology, is a false one. It was not only shown that language 
is deeply confl ated with thought processes such as abstraction (Neuman et al. 2012) and 
even provides an interpretive context for emotion recognition (Barrett et al. 2007) but 
that the meaning of words, considered by Vygotsky as the meeting point of thought and 
language, is deeply embodied in neural processes (Just et al. 2010; Binder, Desai 2011).
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Th ese fi ndings necessarily enact old ideas from semiotics, the study of signs and 
signifi cation (Danesi 2007) as the major semiotic theories such as those of Saussure, 
Vygotsky, and Peirce not only understand the confl ation of language and thought 
but deeply recognize their embodied base. In this context, the current paper may be 
considered to be one instance only in a possible new line of research where the semiotic 
umbrella is used for generating new hypotheses and testing them in silico by using 
current tools of computational semantics.
Th e model/algorithm has three clear benefi ts. First, it is clearly guided by theorization 
originating from semiotics. In this sense, the algorithm is not an engineering project 
evaluated through performance only but a venture theoretically fi rmly grounded in 
ideas from linguistics, semiotics, and psychology.
Th e second benefi t is that in computational terms the model/algorithm is highly 
economic. It does not need heavy computational resources, but only minimal cognitive-
linguistic resources evident in human behaviour.
Th e third pragmatic benefi t is that the model/algorithm produces signifi cant results. 
Being tested against the Concrete-Abstract algorithm, argued to be the “state-of-the-art”, 
our model has improved the accuracy of classifi cation by ten percent, which is not only 
a statistically signifi cant improvement (p < .001), but a signifi cant improvement from 
any common-sensical point of view. Despite the benefi ts of the model/algorithm it is 
a fi rst step only and throughout the paper we have been pointing at our modest and 
limited aim. Th e model is restricted to cases where antonyms exist for the adjective in 
the adjective-noun pair and it has been tested on a small and limited set of adjectives. 
We plan to extend the model/algorithm to other types of metaphors as well and to 
examine further its implications for examining and refi ning opposition theory2.
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Теория оппозиций и вычислительная семиотика
Теория оппозиций утверждает, что основой главных когнитивных и лингвистических 
процессов являются бинарные оппозиции (например, «высокий/низкий»). Однако теория 
оппозиций не находила применения в вычислительных когнитивно-семиотических моде-
лях. В данной статье предлагается простая модель опознания метафор, которая основыва-
ется на теории оппозиций. Алгоритм, основанный на этой модели, был протестирован на 
материале из 100 фраз, содержащих пары «прилагательное-существительное».  Примерно 
половина из них метафоры (например, «черные мысли»), остальные употребляются в 
прямом значении (например, «черные волосы»). С помощью алгоритма метафоры были 
опознаны с точностью 89%,  что иллюстрирует продуктивность применения теории оп-
позиций в моделировании опознания метафор.  
Opositsiooniteooria ja arvutussemiootika
Opositsiooniteooria väidab, et kognitiivsete ja lingvistiliste põhiprotsesside aluseks on 
binaar sed opositsioonid (nt kõrge – madal). Samas pole opositsiooniteooriat rakenda-
tud komputatsioonilistes kognitiiv-semiootilistes mudelites. Käesolevas artiklis pakume 
välja lihtsa metafoorituvastusmudeli, mis toetub opositsiooniteooriale. Mudelit näit -
likustavat algoritmi testiti 100 fraasist koosneval andmekogumil, mis sisaldab omadussõna-
nimisõna paare, millest ligikaudu pooled esindavad metafoorset keelekasutust (nt ‘mustad mõt-
ted’) ja ülejäänud sõna-sõnalist keelekasutust (nt ‘mustad juuksed’). Algoritmi abil tuvastati 
metafoorid 89% täpsusega ning see illustreerib opositsiooniteooria olulisust metafooritöötluse 
modelleerimises.
